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1 Introduction
Whether or not the outcome of capital tax competition is efficient, has mainly been con-
sidered as a matter of instruments. If only source based taxes are available, taxes are too
low and the equilibrium is inefficient (see, e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)), if, in
contrast, also residence based taxes are at hand, efficiency can be restored (see Bucovet-
sky and Wilson (1991)). However, the analysis was restricted to a linearly homogeneous
production function which requires capital intensity to be equalized across regions. Fur-
thermore, the focus was mainly on symmetric equilibria of identical regions. Even if the
assumption of perfect symmetry was relaxed, identical per-capita endowments typically
remained (see Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991)). The recent spatial economics lit-
erature deviates from these assumptions: When technology exhibits increasing returns to
scale, core-periphery pattern are likely to emerge. Tax competition has also been stud-
ied within the framework of the New Economic Geography (NEG) and many results of
the standard competition literature (see the survey by Wilson (1999)) have been reversed:
Core regions may very well tax agglomeration rents without affecting the location of cap-
ital. Furthermore, instead of inducing a monotonic race to the bottom, trade integration
first increases tax rates and later reduces them (see, e.g., Andersson and Forslid (2003),
Baldwin and Krugman (2004), and Borck and Pflu¨ger (2006)). Although these results
are remarkable, the tax competition literature within the NEG framework has two main
shortcomings: First, it relies on the very special assumptions of this strand of literature
and there is good reason to doubt the universal validity of the results. Second, there is no
smooth transition to the standard tax competition model. Neither is the standard model
embedded in the NEG model nor is it the other way round. Especially, for empirical pur-
poses this is truly unsatisfactory. However, there exists a type of model which exhibits
the standard features of the NEG model, while at the same time has the standard model
as a special case. Assuming that real externalities like knowledge spillovers are the main
agglomeration forces, a model with perfect competition and increasing aggregate returns
to scale can be built which comprises both strands of literature (see, e.g. Michel et al.
(1996) and Abdel-Rahman and Anas (2004)). Burbidge and Cuff (2005) have analyzed
tax competition with source and residence based taxes within this framework. They have
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shown that asymmetric equilibria with increasing returns to scale are inefficient even if
source and residence based taxes are available. Furthermore, larger regions may be better
off in equilibrium.1
This paper reconsiders the inefficiency result of Burbidge and Cuff (2005) and shows
that asymmetry and not increasing returns is the main source of inefficiency. Further-
more, it analyzes whether fiscal equalization schemes provide correcting devices. Since
fiscal equalization is common in federations – either explicitly or implicitly via vertical
grants (see, e.g., Boadway and Watts (2004)) – this analysis is of high policy relevance.
Within the standard model of source based capital tax competition it has been shown by
Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) that fiscal equalization schemes
– correctly designed – increase efficiency if regions are only sufficiently symmetric. This
paper shows that agglomeration externalities may very well amplify the positive impact of
a (partial) fiscal equalization scheme.
The following section describes the model and derives the results. Afterwards, a final
section concludes.
2 Model
The country consists of two regions. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed
that total output generates localized positive externalities.2 Output is produced with two
inputs, capital and labor. Capital is interregional mobile, labor is immobile. The output
price is normalized to one.
The production function xij = X

iG(Kij, Nij), with 0 ≤  < 1, characterizes production
of firm j in region i. Here, xij denotes output, Kij and Nij, indicate capital and labor,
respectively. Aggregate output in region i, Xi, raises output, but is considered as exogenous
by each firm.  is a measure of agglomeration externalities. The “internal” production
1A somewhat similar model is used by Boadway et al. (2004).
2This is standard in trade theory, see, e.g., Choi and Yu (2002). In regional economics, the mobile
input is usually considered as source of agglomeration externalities (see, e.g., Fujita and Thisse (2002)).
However, as long as the “internal” production function is Cobb-Douglas, both approaches yield the same
results.
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function G(K,N) is linearly homogeneous, with GKK < 0 < GK and GNN < 0 < GN .
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Both inputs are essential: G(0, N) = G(K, 0) = 0. Due to constant returns to scale at the
firm level, inputs are paid according to their marginal product, profits are zero, and the
number of firms is irrelevant. Hence, regional output can be written as Xi = X

iG(Ki, Ni),
where Ki and Ni denote capital and labor at the regional level. Solving for Xi, yields
Xi = F (Ki, Ni) := G(Ki, Ni)
1/(1−) (1)
and hence
ri = (1− )FK(Ki, Ni) and wi = (1− )FN(Ki, Ni), (2)
where ri and wi is the interest rate and the wage in region i, respectively. Aggregate
output is homogenous of degree 1/(1− ). Were  = 0, returns to scale would be constant,
otherwise, they are increasing. It is assumed that agglomeration externalities are not too
strong: FKK(K,N) < 0.
4
Ni persons live in region i and supply inelastically one unit of labor each. Per-capita
capital endowment in region i is Ki. Total capital and labor is denoted by K := K1+K2 =
K1 +K2 and N := N1 +N2, respectively.
Spatially efficient production Total output is maximized if the marginal product of
mobile capital is equalized across regions:
FK(K1, N1) = FK(K2, N2). (3)
Hence, spatial efficiency requires a uniform return to capital (since the return to capital is
proportional to the marginal product of capital). In regions of equal size, i.e., N1 = N2,
capital should be allocated symmetrically. Using (3), it becomes clear that, starting at a
symmetric allocation of labor and capital, shifting workers from region j to region i should
induce capital movement from region 2 to region i according to
∂Ki
∂Ni
= −FKN(K1, N1) + FKN(K2, N2)
FKK(K1, N1) + FKK(K2, N2)
=
K
N
− 2FK(K/2, N/2)
(1− )NFKK(K/2, N/2)
> 0, i = 1, 2. (4)
3Partial derivatives are indicated by subscripts.
4Krogstrup (2008) analyzes the core-periphery outcome implied by FKK(K,N) > 0.
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If there were no agglomeration externalities, the capital intensity should stay constant;
in the presence of agglomeration externalities the capital intensity in the larger (and,
therefore, more productive) region should increase.
Inefficient tax competition Regional governments levy capital taxes according to the
source principle and redistribute tax revenue lump-sum. Capital taxes may be negative,
and (residence based) lump-sum taxes are available. The source based capital tax rate in
region i is denoted by ti. An interior equilibrium of the capital market equalizes the return
to capital net of taxes across regions:
r1 − t1 = r2 − t2, i.e., (1− )FK(K1, N1)− t1 = (1− )FK(K2, N2)− t2. (5)
Using this equilibrium condition and K1 + K2 = K, capital in region i can be written as
a function of tax rates: Ki(t1, t2), where
∂Ki
∂ti
=
1
dr1
dK1
+ dr2
dK2
=
1
(1− )[FKK(K1, N1) + FKK(K2, N2)] = −
∂Ki
∂tj
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
(6)
An increase in the agglomeration externality strengthens the impact of tax rates on the
spatial allocation of capital. Since public goods are neglected, governments maximize
regional income, namely the sum of labor income, capital income, and tax revenue. At the
market equilibrium, regional income is
Yi = wiNi + (ri − ti)Ki + tiKi = F (Ki, Ni)− (ri − ti)(Ki −Ki), i = 1, 2. (7)
The first-order conditions5 read
∂Yi
∂ti
= Ki −Ki +
[
FK(Ki, Ni) + ti − dri
dKi
(Ki −Ki)
]
∂Ki
∂ti
= 0, i = 1, 2. (8)
Hence, tax rates at the Nash equilibrium when regional governments determine tax rates
simultaneously are:
ti = −FK(Ki, Ni)− (Ki −Ki) drj
dKj
, i = 1, 2, j 6= i. (9)
5It is assumed that these conditions are also sufficient.
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If there are neither capital flows nor agglomeration externalities, tax rates are zero. While
capital importing regions tax capital and, thus, reduce the return to capital, capital ex-
porting regions subsidize capital in order to increase the return to capital (due to the
pecuniary externality identified by DePater and Myers (1994)). Agglomeration externali-
ties offer incentives for regional governments to subsidize capital, since the subsidy is an
internalization device.
From the equilibrium tax rates follows:
ri − ti = FK(Ki, Ni) + (Ki −Ki) drj
dKj
, i = 1, 2, j 6= i. (10)
As a consequence, in the presence of tax competition, capital flows across the border imply
diverging net returns to capital and, therefore, spatial inefficiency. Using the efficiency
condition (3), yields ∂Ki/∂Ni > 0 for a given total population and a given total capital
endowment, which leads immediately to the following proposition.6
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium of tax competition is spatially efficient if and only
if under autarky marginal products of capital are equalized across regions. The alloca-
tion of labor must be accompanied by a unique allocation of capital endowment defined by
FK(K1, N1) = FK(K −K1, N −N1).
If regions are identical ex ante in terms of labor and capital endowment, the tax competition
equilibrium is efficient. Otherwise, the equilibrium is generically inefficient, since for every
allocation of the total population, only one single allocation of capital endowment allows
for spatial efficiency. Without agglomeration externalities per-capita capital endowment
should be equalized across regions; with agglomeration externalities, the larger region has
to have a larger per-capita endowment of capital.
Tax competition, asymmetry, and fiscal equalization In the following, it will be
analyzed whether a fiscal equalization scheme which partially redistributes tax bases and
standardized tax revenue mitigates or aggravates spatial inefficiency. The transfer to region
i is calculated as
Zi = (αt¯+ β)
(
K
N
− Ki
Ni
)
Ni, i = 1, 2. (11)
6See for n regions without agglomeration externalities, Peralta and van Ypersele (2005).
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Here, t¯ = (t1K1 + t2K2)/K is the average tax rate, α, with 0 ≤ α < 1, is the degree
of equalization with respect to standardized tax revenue and β, with β ≥ 0, denotes
the degree of equalization with respect to the tax base. Hence, regional income is Yi =
F (Ki, Ni)− (ri − ti)(Ki −Ki) + Zi. Nash equilibrium first-order conditions become
∂Yi
∂ti
= Ki −Ki + αKi
(
Ni
N
− Ki
K
)
+
[
FK(Ki, Ni) + ti − dri
dKi
(Ki −Ki) (12)
+α(ti − tj)
(
Ni
N
− Ki
K
)
− αt¯− β
]
∂Ki
∂ti
= 0, i = 1, 2, j 6= i,
when regional governments take the impact of their tax policy on the average tax rate into
account. Hence, in a symmetrical equilibrium of identical regions tax rates are
t1 = t2 =
β − FK(K/2, N/2)
1− α . (13)
Equalization of standardized tax revenue increases the equilibrium tax rates if β > 
FK(K/2, N/2). An increase in a region’s tax rate leads to capital outflow. This implies a
higher transfer provided that tax rates are positive and/or tax base equalization is strong.
Using the first-order conditions (12) and the capital market condition (5), yields
FK(K1, N1)− FK(K2, N2) +
(
dr1
dK1
+
dr2
dK2
)
× (14){
K1 −K1 + α
[
K1
(
N1
N
− K1
K
)
−K2
(
N2
N
− K2
K
)]}
= 0.
This equation reveals the relationship between the distortion of tax competition and the
fiscal equalization scheme. Without fiscal equalization, i.e. if α = 0, the capital-importing
region levys a too high capital tax (subsidizes too little), and, therefore, attracts too little
capital. As a consequence, the marginal product of capital is too high in this region. Due to
the fiscal equalization scheme, an increase in the average tax rate t¯ pays off for a particular
region if the capital intensity is rather low. Hence, if the region with the lower capital
intensity imports capital, fiscal equalization aggravates spatial distortions. Otherwise, it
might improve efficiency.
Defining
∆ :=
2− − α(1− )
1− 
(
dr1
dK1
+
dr2
dK2
)
< 0, (15)
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and using (14), starting at a symmetrical equilibrium of identical regions the impact of
(exogenously determined) relocation of workers from region 2 to region 1 on the allocation
of capital can be written as
∂K1
∂N1
= −
FKN(K1, N1) + FKN(K2, N2) + α
K
N
(
dr1
dK1
+ dr2
dK2
)
∆
(16)
and a movement of capital endowment from region 2 to region 1 induces
∂K1
∂K1
=
dr1
dK1
+ dr2
dK2
∆
> 0. (17)
Hence, the impact of combined relocation of workers and capital endowment on the allo-
cation of capital can be calculated: dK1/dN1 = ∂K1/∂N1 + (∂K1/∂K) (K/N). Since the
symmetric equilibrium is efficient, the deviation of equilibrium capital flows from the effi-
cient change in the allocation of capital is of particular interest. Using (4), these deviations
are
∂K1
∂N1
∣∣∣∣
Opt
− ∂K1
∂N1
∣∣∣∣
NE
=
(1− )FKK(K/2, N/2)K − 2(1− α)FK(K/2, N/2)
[2− − α(1− )]FKK(K/2, N/2)N
> 0 (18)
and
∂K1
∂N1
∣∣∣∣
Opt
− dK1
dN1
∣∣∣∣
NE
= − 2(1− α)FK(K/2, N/2)
[2− − α(1− )]FKK(K/2, N/2)N
≥ 0. (19)
From (18) follows that a larger and poorer region – independent of whether or not ag-
glomeration externalities arise – employs too little capital relative to the optimum, even
in the presence of a fiscal equalization scheme. The sign of the derivative of (18) with
respect to α is ambiguous. Hence, a fiscal equalization scheme may very well aggravate
spatial inefficiency. This would happen with certainty if there were no agglomeration ex-
ternalities. In the presence of agglomeration externalities, additional capital flows in the
larger region. Eventually, the capital intensity in the larger region may be higher than in
the smaller region. Under these circumstances, the fiscal equalization scheme provides an
incentive to lower the tax rate thereby attracting more capital and increasing efficiency.
Numerical simulations show that this is indeed possible if agglomeration externalities are
rather strong. The following proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 2 Starting at a symmetric tax competition Nash equilibrium of identical re-
gions, relocation of labor without movement of capital endowment induces too little parallel
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capital flows. If agglomeration externalities are sufficiently strong, the fiscal equalization
scheme may increase spatial efficiency. Otherwise, fiscal equalization worsens the outcome
of tax competition.
(19) confirms proposition 1, since relocation of workers without a change in the per-
capita endowment of capital would maintain spatial efficiency if there were no agglomer-
ation externalities. Under the circumstances, the fiscal equalization scheme has no effect.
In contrast, if externalities occur, the larger region employs too little capital, albeit more
than the smaller region. Since then the derivative of (19) with respect to α is unambigu-
ously negative, the fiscal equalization scheme improves the allocation of capital. At the
equilibrium, the capital intensity of the larger region exceeds that of the smaller region
implying that the larger region could reduce transfers to the smaller region by reducing
its tax rate. At the end, fiscal equalization leads to a welfare enhancing capital inflow.
Full equalization, i.e., α = 1, would actually completely restore efficiency. The result is
summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Starting at a symmetric tax competition Nash equilibrium of identical re-
gions, relocation of labor with parallel movement of capital endowment induces too lit-
tle parallel capital flows only if agglomeration externalities arise. The fiscal equalization
scheme serves as a corrective device.
3 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed tax competition when lump-sum taxes are available in a model
which allows for agglomeration externalities. It has shown that asymmetry and not increas-
ing aggregate returns to scale is the main source of inefficiency. Furthermore, it has shown
that agglomeration externalities may very well amplify the positive impact of a (partial)
fiscal equalization scheme. In the presence of agglomeration externalities in regions with
identical per-capita capital endowment, but with different population size, a scheme that
equalizes standardized tax revenue across regions increases the efficiency of the allocation of
capital. If, in addition, per-capita endowments of capital differ, a fiscal equalization scheme
8
has also turned out to be efficiency enhancing provided that agglomeration externalities
are sufficiently strong.
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